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 Against the Lord's anointed: aspects of 
warfare and baronial rebellion in England 
and Normandy, 1075-1265  
Matthew Strickland  
For who can stretch forth his hand against the Lord's 
anointed and be guiltless?1  
Within a framework of arbitrary, monarchical government, 
baronial rebellion formed one of the principal means both of 
expressing political discontent and of seeking the redress of 
grievances. So frequent were its manifestations that hostilities 
arising from armed opposition to the crown account for a large 
proportion of warfare waged in England, Normandy and the 
continental Angevin lands in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. 
The subject of revolt, lying as it does close to the heart of crown-
baronial interaction, is as fundamental as it is multifaceted, 
embracing many issues of central importance, for example the 
legal status of revolt and its complex relationship with concepts of 
treason; the nature of homage and fealty, and the question of the 
revocability of these bonds in relation to the king; the growth in 
notions of the crown, of maiestas and the influence of Roman Law; 
political theories of resistance and obedience; the limitations 
imposed by ties of kinship and of political sympathy among the 
baronage on the king's ability to suppress revolt and to enforce 
effective punishment; and the extent of the king's logistical and 
military superiority.  
A detailed examination of such major themes is naturally 
beyond the scope of a single essay.2 Elsewhere I have suggested 
how the context of revolt affected behaviour in warfare,  
1. I Samuel 26: 9.  
 2. I hope to explore these themes further in a monograph, currently under preparation, 
on baronial rebellion and the nature of warfare in the context of revolt.  
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particularly in relation to conventions of war governing 
siege.3 What follows addresses the closely related question of 
how far the presence of the ruler - whether king, duke or 
count - affected the nature of warfare fought against rebellious 
vassals.  
Whatever the underlying disputes that had led elements of 
the baronage to resort to arms, be it grievances over land, title 
or the disbursement of patronage, a desire for enhanced local 
autonomy, or support for a royal cadet or other dynastic rivals 
to the throne, the failure ofthe political process and reversion 
to the mechanisms of war confronted opponents of the crown 
with a formidable series of dilemmas. Whether their avowed 
aim was the deposition of the king for a rival claimant, or 
merely the enforcement of a reform manifesto such as Magna 
Carta or the Provisions of Oxford, the successful prosecution 
of their claims would almost certainly entail a direct military 
confrontation with the king. They would thus have to resist by 
force or actively assault the christus domini, the Anointed of the 
Lord, the divinely sanctioned receptacle of legitimate 
authority, who had been elected, proclaimed and consecrated.  
The person of the monarch represented a fusion of two 
fundamental sources of authority, feudal lordship and sacral 
kingship.4 Hallowed by unction, set apart from and above other 
men, the king could command the fealty of all subjects, 
reinforced in the. case of many if not all of the effective 
political nation by liegehomage.5 Such homage, frequently 
extracted as an integral part of the process of designation of an 
heir,6 might also be demanded by the king at times of political 
crisis as a deliberate counter to actual  
3. M. J. Strickland, 'The Conduct and Perception of War under the Anglo-Norman 
and Angevin Kings, 1075-1217' (Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1989), 
ch. 4 pp. 145-76.  
4. For the nature of kingship see J.E.A. Joliffe, Angevin Kingship (London, 1955), and 
E. Mason, Norman Kingship (Bangor, 1991). Also, for example, E. H. Kantorowicz, 
The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton, 1957).  
5. For the celebrated oath of Salisbury in 1086, see ASC, 'E', s.a. 1086, andJ. C. Holt, 
'1086', in Domesday Studies, ed. J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1987), pp. 41-64; and for 
submission and oath-taking as prominent features of the coronation ceremony see, 
for example, ASC, 'E', s.a. 1087 and 1100. Though not its principal aim, the inquest 
that resulted in the Cariae baronum of 1166 had as an important secondary purpose 
the discovery of undertenants who had not performed homage and sworn fealty to 
Henry II and his son, the young Henry, Red Book, I, 217, 400, 412, as did the Inquest 
of Sheriffs in 1170, Gervase, I, 217; Stubbs, Charters, p. 177, c. xiii.  
6 See e.g. Robert of Torigny, in Chronicles of Stephen, Henry II and Richard, IV, 184, on 
1155; ibid., 296, on II63; and 'Benedict', I, 6, on 1170.  
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or threatened rebellion.7 That Henry II kept a roll not only of those 
who had sworn him homage8 but also of those who had 
subsequently broken faith is strongly suggested by the extensive 
lists incorporated by Roger of Howden in his Gesta Hennci of those 
taken prisoner in the war of 1173-4, carefully stating date and place 
of capture and clearly drawn from an official source.9  
Ecclesiastical writers, always quick to stress the enormity of 
violating such fundamental bonds, could be provoked to 
vociferous indignation by direct assaults on the person of the 
monarch during rebellion. Speaking of William Crispin's attack on 
Henry I at the battle of Bremule, 1119, where he succeeded in 
striking the king on the helmet, Orderic Vitalis exclaimed:  
What a rash crime he had attempted, when brandishing his sword in his 
right hand, he raised it above the head that had been anointed with the 
holy chrism by the hands of bishops and crowned with the royal diadem, 
while the people rejoiced and chanted grateful praises to God.lO  
Orderic's sentiments were clearly coloured by his deep-seated 
admiration for Henry I. Yet a century later, Matthew Paris, who 
was no royal apologist, could share the view that it was unction 
that rendered the person of the monarch inviolate, even if that 
monarch was King John. Interpolating a no doubt apocryphal 
anecdote into Wendover's chronicle, Paris has William d'Aubigny, 
commander of the rebel garrison of Rochester, prevent one of his 
crossbowmen from firing at John with the words, 'No, no! Far be it 
from us, base villein, to cause the death of the Lord's anointed.'ll 
This concept of unction as a potent mechanism for the hallowing 
and protection of kings had been inherited by the Norman rulers 
from their Old English predecessors in an already  
7. See e.g. on 1209, CM, II, 525; Annals of Waverley, 262, Gervase, II, 104; cf. 
Holt, Northerners, p. 207. John again countered desertion in 1215 by requiring 
homage and a general oath of fealty, an act which the Barnwell chronicler 
believed to be a deliberate counterstroke to the baronial demand late in 1214 
to confirm Henry I's coronation charter:Memoriale fratris Walteri de Coventria, ed. 
W. Stubbs, 2 vols. (RS, 1872-3),11,218; CM, 11, 584.  
8. Such a list is revealed by the 1166 catla of the archbishop of York: Red 
Book,     I, 412. Such a roll might also be kept by honotiallords. See e.g. 
Orderic, III, 184-5.  
9. 'Benedict', I, 45-7, 56--7.  
10. Orderic, VI, 238--g.  
11. CM, II, 627. 'In this case', adds Paris, 'he was like David who spared Saul 
when he could have slain him. This circumstance was afterwards known to the 
king, who notwithstanding this, did not wish to spare William when his 
prisoner, but would have hung him had he been permitted.'  
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well-developed form.12 The author of the Vita Edwardi stressed 
Godwin's deep reluctance to fight against his lord the king and, 
following his successful revanche in 1052, compared him at length to 
David sparing Saul as the Lord's anointed.13 Even William I's 
Norman apologists experienced some discomfort in the fact that 
Harold had been consecrated king, leading William of Poitiers to 
declare this unction invalid since it had been administered by the 
schismatic Stigand.14  
To the author of the Gesta Stephani, by contrast, the enormity of 
the king's defeat and humiliation at Lincoln in 1141 lay less in the 
violation of his sacral kingship than in the fact that a liege lord had 
been overthrown by his own vassals.15 While one clearly cannot 
take at face value the sentiments of contrition ascribed by the Gesta 
to Stephen's opponents, his comments may well echo the feelings 
of shock and confusion that some, perhaps many, would have felt 
at this drastic inversion of the natural order.16 Even William of 
Malmesbury, Robert of Gloucester's apologist, felt obliged to offer 
a lengthy justification for Stephen's defeat and seizure at Lincoln.17  
12 Anglo-Saxon kingship in turn had been heavily influenced by Carolingian theory and 
practice. For the importance of unction for the legitimisation of the Arnulfing dynasty 
and in notions of Carolingian kingship in general see W. Ullmann, The Carolingian 
Renaissance and the Idea of Kingship (London, 1969), pp. 53-4. 71-11O. As Ullman (p. 54) 
notes: 'The Germanic Ruler embodied a sacred and magical mythos because of his 
blood kinship with distant ancestors; this was now replaced by an equally sacred 
mythos that was derived from divine sanction and grace.'  
13 The Life of King Edward, ed. and tr. F. Barlow (London, 1962), pp. 27-30.  
14 G. S. Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda: Some Implications of the Norman Claim 
to the Throne of England in 1066', TRHS, 5th ser., XXXVI (1986), 9B-9.  
15 As in all probability a bishop himself, he reserved his homily against touching the 
Lord's anointed for Stephen's attack in 1139 on the Le Poer bishops, where the author 
quotes Zechariah 2: 8, 'He that toucheth you toucheth the apple of mine eye' and 
Psalm 105: 15, 'Touch not mine anointed.' He saw the king's subsequent defeat and 
capture at Lincoln as divine retribution for this act: GS, pp. xviii-xl, 76-7, 110-15.  
16 GS, pp. 112-I5: 'When at length they disarmed him and he kept on crying out in a 
humbled voice of complaint that this mark of ignominy had indeed come upon him 
because God avenged his injuries, and yet they were not innocent of a monstrous 
crime in breaking their faith, condemning their oath, caring nothing for the homage 
they had pledged him, and rebelling so wickedly and so abominably against the man 
they had chosen of their own will as their lord and king, they were all so much 
softened by tender emotions of pity and compassion that they not only broke forth 
into tears and lamentations but repentance was very deeply imprinted in their hearts 
and faces.'  
17 HN, pp. 47-8. Equally, it was Malmesbury who noted that on his release Stephen laid 
a complaint before the Council of Westminster, summoned by his brother Henry of 
Blois, 'because his men had both captured and almost killed, by the grievous burden 
of their insults, one who had never refused them justice (p.62).  
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Such sentiments flowed naturally from the pens of ecclesiastics, 
not only imbued with Old Testament notions of kingship, but also 
who saw in the person of the monarch the most effective guarantee 
of order, stability and, above all, peace for Holy Church. Yet, if we 
seek a more official expression of such notions, we need look no 
further than the laconic statement in clause 61 of Magna Carta, 
which, while empowering the baronial committee of twenty-five to 
distrain John 'by seizing castles, lands, possessions, and in such 
other ways as they can', adds simply, 'saving our person and those 
of our queen and our children'.18 
The inviolacy which unction conferred upon the person of the king, 
however, was not simply passive and defensive. The king emanated a 
potent 'mythos and aura' ,19 which might receive tangible expression 
both in his thaumaturgical powers or in concepts such as the king's 
hand-given peace.20 So too in war, the power of the king's presence 
might assume an aggressi.ve, offensive quality which one might almost 
term a 'military ( charisma'. Wallace-Hadrill, speaking of the early 
Frankish kings, described them as Heerkonigen, warrior kings, men who 
fused the roles of rex sacerdos and dux. Success lay in being possessed of 
jortitudo or military virtus, and jelicitas, that is a 'fruitful good luck that 
stems from nobilitas' .21 Naturally, the increasing sophistication of 
kingship by the twelfth century must qualify this parallel. But though 
the virility of the king might no longer be seen to bless the land with 
fecundity, there can be no doubt that one of the king's primary 
functions - arguably the primary function remained as a warleader, and 
that his virtus continued to be a vital ingredient in his military and 
political success, as it was still felt to  
be when Machiavelli wrote his Prince. And though perhaps not 
imbued with the same depth of meaning as to a Merovingian 
observer, contemporaries of the Anglo-Norman kings were clearly 
aware of a kind of jelicitas, an aura that accompanied a ruler  
18 Holt, Magna Carta, pp. 470-1.  
19 The phrase is UlImann's: Carolingian Renaissance, p. 54.  
20 See M. Bloch, Les Rois thaumaturges. Etude sur la caractere supernaturel attribuei a la puissance 
royale particulierement en France et Angleterre (Strasbourg, 1924). For the concept of the royal 
handgrith or mund, see LHP, 10 I, 12 la, 13 I, Downer, pp. 108, 114, 116 (which draw on I Cnut 2 
2 and I Cnut 3 3), and LHP68 2, Downer, p. 214. Violation of the peace given by the king's 
own hand was a crime unatoneable by money (12 la, Downer, p. 114) and might be punished 
by loss of limb (79 3, Downer, p. 246).  
21.  J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, The Long-Haired Kings (Oxford, 1962), pp. 154-7, 163.  
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successful in war, be it as a general, a besieger or as an individual 
warrior.  
It was this concept of royal feticitas that Orderic had in mind 
when, censuring William the Conqueror for his execution of Earl 
Waltheof in 1076, he noted that after this deed, the luck in battle 
that had always hitherto attended William disappeared through 
divine vengeance.22 William of Malmesbury was similarly con-
scious of William I's good fortune in war and conquest,23 while 
Snorri Sturluson, though writing nearly two centuries later, 
regarded Harald Hardradi's 'great victory-luck' in war as one of 
his outstanding attributes.24  
Even in adverse situations, the king's person might still com-
mand a respect verging on awe. William of Malmesbury records 
how, during the siege of Mont-St-Michel against Prince Henry,  
Rufus, although alone, charged a group of Henry's knights,    
'confident that none would resist him'. One of the knights slew  
his horse, however, and was drawing his sword on the prostrate   
monarch when Rufus shouted in alarm that he was the king. His 
erstwhile opponents drew back, then at once helped him 
respectfully to his feet and gave him a fresh mount. The king then 
asked which of the knights had unhorsed him, and received the 
reply from the knight who had, 'It was I, who took you not for a 
king but for a knight.' Rufus - and this was the reason for 
Malmesbury's anecdote - rewarded his courage and honesty by 
granting him membership of the familia regis.25  
The king's attendance or absence from a campaign was there-
fore of the profoundest importance. The king's presence bolstered 
the morals of royal forces and might intimidate the enemy. When 
in 1146 Ranulf of Chester attempted to persuade  
Stephen to accompany him against the Welsh, he stated, according 
to the Gesta Stephani, 'that the enemy would be alarmed merely by 
hearing the king's name' and 'that he [Ranulf] would dishearten 
them more by the dread of the king's presence than if he strove to 
bring with him many thousand fighters without  
 
22 Orderic, II, 350-1.  23 GR, II 317.  
24 King Harald's Saga, tr. M. Magnusson and H. Palsson (Harmondsworth, 1966), pp. 
160, and 149. where at Stamford Bridge Harold Godwinsson is made to say of 
Hardradi, 'What a big, formidable man he is: let us hope his good luck has now run 
out.'  
25 GR, II, 364.  
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it' .26 As late as 1513, Henry VIII's arguments to the Privy Council 
for leading the expedition to France in person were not only that 
there had been a long tradition of English kings leading their men 
to victory, but that defeats had been suffered because of the 
absence of the king. Men were eager to face death when led by 
their sovereign, whereas with any other commander, however 
able, troops would be milder in nature and fight badly.27 
Conversely, Richard of Hexham noted that the absence of 
Stephen from the royal army at the battle of the Standard in 1138 
was a severe blow, the king being their principem et conductorem belli, 
and no doubt the vast armoury of spiritual weaponry in the shape 
of relics and banners mustered by Archbishop Thurstan was 
designed in large part to compensate for this handicap.28 Similarly, 
in 1173 the royal forces under the justiciar, Richard de Lucy, 
marched to battle against the earl of Leicester's army at Fornham 
with the banner of St Edmund at their head.29 One -potent source 
of psychological aid was needed to replace another.  
Nowhere in war, moreover, was the king's presence more 
significant than in the context of rebellion. For while rebels were 
prepared ipso facto to defy the king's authority, some, perhaps even 
the majority, were reluctant to face the person of the king in armed 
conflict. When in her Livre des faiz darmes Christine de Pisan urged 
princes not to risk their lives in battle lest their deaths bring 
political and military disaster, she made the crucial exception of 
situations of revolt. Here kings should lead the army, 'since in the 
nature of things the subject fears to offend the majesty of his 
sovereign lord, especially when the latter is present in person'.30 It 
was an acute observation. When during the mounting political 
crisis in 1051, Godwin and his sons mustered their forces, they were  
26 CS, pp. 193-4.  
27 The Anglica Historia of Polydore Vergil, AD 1485-1537, ed. and tr. D. Hay, Camden Soc., 
NS, LXXIV (1950), p. 197.  
28 De gestis regis Stcphani et de bello Standardii, ed. J. Raine in The Priory of Hexham, its 
Chroniclers, Endowments and Annals, 2 vols., Surtees Soc., XLIV (1868), I, 87, 90-1. 
Similarly, in 1194, an Anglo-Norman force under Count John and the earl of Leicester 
felt unable to confront Philip's army which was operating in Normandy not simply 
because they were outnumbered but because they lacked the king's presence: Howden, 
III, 253.  
 29 'Benedict', I, 61.    
30 The Book of Fayttes of Armes and of Chyvalrye Translated and Printed by William Caxton 
from the French Original by Christine de Pisan, ed. A. T. P. Byles (Early English Texts 
Society, 1927), p. 19   
 
 
 nevertheless 'reluctant to stand against their royal lord' , and when 
Edward summoned all the thegns to his standard, Godwin's army 
melted away.31 Faced with the revolt of William of Arques in 1054, 
Duke William's men urged him to wait for the arrival of his main 
army before attacking Arques itself, but 'they were reassured by the 
reply that those rebelling against him would not dare anything when 
they saw he himself was present'.32 
That such an assumption was not simply the inflated rhetoric of 
William of Poitiers is suggested by other incidents. At the siege of 
Courcy in 1091, for example, Hugh de Grandmesnil offered his lord, 
Robert Curthose, two hundred livres if he would withdraw from the 
besieging forces for just one day, so that Hugh could sally out and 
attack Robert de Belleme in the duke's absence. 'It seems', Orderic 
has Hugh say to the duke, 'that Robert [of Belleme] trusts too much 
in your protection and keeps the besieged in check more through 
their respect for their fealty to their lord than from fear of enemy 
arms. '33  
Similarly, Joinville recorded how, in 1230, the young St Louis had 
marched to the aid of the count of Champagne against the baronial 
coalition headed by Peter of Brittany, and offered them battle. The 
barons, however, 'sent and begged him to withdraw himself in person 
from the fight', pledging that if he would do so they would give battle 
with the count of Champagne and the duke of Lorraine with 300 
knights less than the count or duke. But Louis refused, saying 'that he 
would not let them fight against his men unless he himself was there 
in person with them', whereupon the baronial army withdrew.34 Here, 
Joinville sought to stress the courage and puissance of St Louis even 
as a boy, just as Orderic had been eager to demonstrate the vassalic 
propriety of Hugh, a leading patron of St-Evroul. Yet both incidents 
show the constraints that might be placed on baronial action by the 
presence of king or lord, and the desire to proffer financial or 
military concessions to circumvent this problem.  
Though space precludes a discussion of the relation in war 
between the Capetians and their Norman and Angevin vassals in  
31 ASC, 'E', 'D', s.a. 1051. 32 GC, p. 56.  
 33 Orderic, IV, 234-5.   
34 Joinville's Life of Louis, tr. M. R. B. Shaw in Joinville and Villehardouin: Chronicles of 
the Crusades (Harmondsworth, 1963), p. 185.  
 this context,35 one cannot here omit reference to Henry II's refusal 
to attack Toulouse in 1159 once his lord, Louis VII, had entered the 
city. Some French historians such as Boussard have dismissed this 
motive for Henry's withdrawal as merely an excuse for over-
extended lines of communication and logistical problems.36 In the 
light of these and other examples, however, one must be more 
circumspect. Henry was still young, and such acts of propriety 
may have featured strongly in his self-perception as a warrior, or 
indeed as a king himself. A revealing passage in fitzStephen's Life 
of Becket suggests that there was disagreement over Henry's actions 
within the army itself. Becket, then chancellor, had urged an 
assault on Toulouse, since the size of Henry's army guaranteed the 
capture of both the city and the French king. Henry, however,  
followed the advice of others, and from foolish scruples and respect for the 
king of France his overlord, hesitated to attack the city, although the 
Chancellor argued to the contrary that the French king had forfeited his 
position as overlord by engaging in hostilities against the English king in 
defiance of existing treaties.37  
Similarly, William ofPoitiers, anxious to stress his hero's propriety 
as a wronged vassal, recorded how Duke William opposed the 
attacks of King Henry I of France on Normandy, but 'not without 
showing ... the regard due to an old friendship as well as to the 
royal dignity. He carefully restrained himself from engaging in 
battle with the king's army, with him [Henry I] present, unless he 
was constrained only by necessity.'38 
Contemporaries, whether opponents or supporters of the crown, 
clearly distinguished between the gravity of varying acts of 
hostility in revolt. Thus in the incidents recorded by Orderic and 
joinville, the baronial rebels had refused to fight against the person 
of the ruler, but were still prepared to engage with his forces in his 
absence. Such distinctions are seen still more clearly in 1233, when 
the political opposition of Richard Marshal and his suppbrters to 
Henry III degenerated into localised warfare in the  
35 See, however, J. F. Lemarignier, Recherches sur l'hommage en marche et les frontieres feodales  
(Lille, 1945)'  
36 J. Boussard, Le gouvemement de Henri 11 Plantagenet (Paris, 1956), p. 420 and n. I. 
37 MTB, III, 334.  
38 GG, pp. 28-9.  
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south-west marches of Wales. The Marshal had surrendered his 
castle of Usk to the king on a pledge, ratified by the bishops, that 
Henry would return the fortress to him within fifteen days. When 
Henry failed to honour this agreement, Richard stormed the castle, 
killing several of the king's knights, then proceeded to launch 
concerted attacks on Henry's Poitevin mercenaries either in 
pitched battle or in ambush, giving no quarter to these alien 
stipendiaries.39 Nevertheless, when his Welsh and baronial allies 
planned to attack the king as he lay before Grosmont castle, 
Richard refused to take part. On subsequently being accused of 
treason by Henry's partisans for assaulting the king's person, he 
vehemently insisted on his own absence from the engagement at 
Grosmont. He added that if by chance any of his household had 
been present, they had not attacked the king's person but only his 
following, and that with ample justification.4o  
These distinctions between holding a castle against the king's 
authority, waging localised warfare or joining battle with royal 
forces in the king's absence, and the far more serious offence of 
attacking the person of the monarch himself receive more concrete 
expression in the Dictum of Kenilworth, 1266. Here the ransoms to be 
paid by rebels to regain their lands differed markedly according to 
their actions in the war of 1264-5. Culpability was graded, with the 
most serious offenders being those who had fought in the main 
engagements of the war, and who were distinguished from those 
who had either lent moral support if not active aid to the rebels, or 
those who had partici-  
pated out of coercion, with the penalties diminishing accord-  
ingly.41 At the head of the list are cited:  
Those who fought at the start of the war and are still in arms; those who 
held Northampton violently and maliciously against the king; those who 
fought and assailed the king at Lewes; those who were captured at 
Kenilworth after having sacked Winchester; those who have in other ways 
opposed the king and have not been pardoned; those who fought at 
Evesham; those who were in the battle of Chesterfield ... shall pay five 
times the annual value of their land.42  
 39 CM, Ill, 252-6.  40 Ibid., 253, 258, 260.  
41 Documents of the Baronial Movement of Reform and Rebellion, 1258-1267, selected by R. H.  
Treharne and ed. I.J. Saunders (Oxford, 1973), pp. 324-5, 332-3.  
42 Ibid., pp. 324-5. This clause covers all the main acts of resistance and aggression from the 
start of the war, which the royal justices adjudged to have begun on 4 April 1264.  
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The phraseology itself distinguishes between Lewes, where the 
active nature of the rebel assault and its direction against the king 
is stressed, 'expugnantes et debellantes regem apud Lewes', and, 
the engagements at Chesterfield and Evesham where the baronial 
forces were themselves attacked, where the language is more 
passive - 'qui fuerunt apud Chestrefeud in bello', 'bellantes apud 
Evesham'.43  
That these distinctions were far more than dry theory is 
suggested by the striking fact that the great majority of engage-
ments which occurred in the context of baronial rebellion were 
fought in the absence of the king. The battles of Fagunduna, 1075, 
Bourgtheroulde, 1124, Dol and Fornham, 1173, and the second battle 
of Lincoln, 1217, were fought only against the kings' representatives 
- especially vice-regents, units of the familia regis, Brabancon 
mercenaries, the justiciar or the rector regis et regni, William 
Marshal, and his colleagues. On all these occasions, moreover, it 
seems that the decision to offer battle lay with the royalist forces.  
Pitched battles fought by rebels against kings were extremely 
rare: Gerberoi, 1079, Lincoln, 1141, Wilton, 1143, and Lewes, 1265, 
stand in virtual isolation. The major engagements of Stephen's 
reign, moreover, were fought in exceptional circumstances, due to 
Robert of Gloucester's consistent ability to field forces that 
equalled if not outmatched those of the king, and to their context 
being more that of a civil war between two contending claimants 
than an extended revolt. But even here it should be noted that the 
battle of Lincoln was won by men who had little or nothing to lose 
- Robert of Gloucester, irrevocably committed to his sister's cause, 
Ranulf of Chester, whose castle and family were under siege, the 
'disinherited' and Welsh auxiliaries.44 According to Orderic, 
Stephen had believed they would not dare fight, while William of 
Malmesbury states that Stephen's earls expected only desultory 
jousts to win ransoms and glory and were taken completely 
unawares by a full-scale attack.45  
In those engagements where rebels did fight against the king,  
43 Ibid., p. 324. A number of rebe1s were singled out for higher ransoms, notably Ferrers 
and those among the garrison of Kenilworth who had been responsible for the 
mutilation of a royal messenger: pp. 326-7.  
44 Orderic, VI, 538-43.  
45 Orderic, VI, 540-1; HN,49'  
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moreover they were often part of an army consisting of external 
opponents, as for example at Gerberoi, where Robert Curthose was 
backed by the elite French knights of the garrison of Gerberoi,46 
Bremule, where William Crispin and other disaffected Normans 
were but part of Louis VI's main army,47 and Grosmont, where 
Richard Marshal's baronial allies were strongly supported by the 
forces of Llewelyn ap lorwerth.48  
In contrast to Stephen and Henry III, William Rufus, Henry I, 
Henry II andJohn never had to fight an equivalent rebel army in 
open battle. No major engagements took place involving the king 
in person during the rebellions of 1088, 1095, 1173-4 or 1215-17. 
Orderic encapsulates this notion when describing the defence of 
Roctester against Rufus in 1088: 'For although the rebels were 
numerous and well supplied with treasure and arms and abundant 
equipment, they did not dare to engage the king in open battle in 
his own kingdom [contra regem in regno suo preliari]'.49  
Underlying and reinforcing any scruples against resisting the 
king qua" lord or sovereign were, of course, more pragmatic 
military considerations. The reluctance of any medieval com-
mander to hazard the risks of battle except in the most favourable 
circumstances is now a well-established theme.50 In the case of 
rebel lords such natural dictates of fear were enhanced by a clear 
recognition both of the severe penalties of failure and the frequent 
- though not automatic - superiority in numbers and military 
proficiency of the royal forces.  
Such superiority is most evident at the battles of Bourg-
theroulde, 1124, where the professionalism of a unit of Henry I's 
familia regis triumphed over the charge of Waleran of Meulan's 
knights;51 of Dol, 1173, where Henry I1's Brabancon mercenaries 
defeated the coalition of Ralph de Fougeres, Hugh of Chester  
 46 Orderic, VI, 108-II.  47 Orderic, VI, 236-7.  
48 CM, Ill, 253; F. M. Powicke, King Henry III and the Lord Edward (Oxford, 1947), p. 131. 
49 Orderic, IV, 126-9.  
50 See especially J.Bradbury, 'Battles in England and Normandy, 1066-1154', ANS, VI 
(1983), 1-12; J. Gillingham, 'Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages', in 
War and Government in the Middle Ages, ed. J. Gillingham and J. C. Holt (Woodbridge, 
1986), pp. 78-91; idem, 'William the Bastard at War', in Studies in Medieval History 
Presented to R Alten Brown, ed. C. Harper-Bill, C.J. Holdsworth and J.L. Nelson 
(Woodbridge, Ig8g), pp. 141-58; idem, 'War and Chivalry in the History of William the 
Marshal', in Thirteenth Century England, II, ed. P. R. Coss and S. D. Lloyd 
(Woodbridge, 1988), pp. 1-13·  
51 Orderic, VI, 348-51.  
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and others;52 Fornham, also 1173, where the earl of Leicester's 
Flemings were overwhelmed by the numerically superior cavalry 
of Richard de Lucy;53 and, much later, to quote the chronicler 
Robert of Gloucester, 'the murder of Evesham, for battle none it 
was' .54 In addition to his ability to command the knight-service of 
kingdom or duchy, the king's resources allowed him to hire 
mercenaries on a larger scale and for longer periods than his rebel 
oPponents, be they the thousand knights envisaged in Henry I's 
indenture of 1101 with the count of Flanders,55 William ofYpres's 
Flemings,56 or the Brabancon and other routiers employed by the 
Angevin kings as one of their most effective measures against  
 rebellious lords.57  ~  
The king enjoyed the same advantages in siege warfare as in 
campaigIlcs of movement. He could usually command an effective 
siege train, with professional engineers, sappers and other 
specialists.58 At Dol in 1173, and Nottingham in 1194, for instance, 
the king brought siege engines to the besiegers already in situ,59 and 
at· the latter siege, Richard employed Greek fire against the 
rebels.60 John's siege of Rochester, and later Henry III's siege of  
52 Torigny in Chronicles of Stephen, Henry I1 and Richard, IV, 260; Diceto, I, 377-8, who 
notes that Leicester's force was numerically superior in terms of infantry, containing 
3,000 Flemish mercenaries, but that in terms of knights he was outnumbered fourfold 
by the army of the justiciar. As a result, Henry II's men defeated the rebels 'in 
momento, in ictu oculi'; 'Benedict', I, 61-2.  
53 'Benedict', I, 61; Gervase, II, 246; Ralph of Coggeshall, Chronicon Anglicanum, ed. J. 
Stevenson (RS, 1875), p. 17; Jordan Fantosmes Chronicle, ed. R. C. Johnston (Oxford, 
1981),11. 1002-85.  
54 The Metrical Chronicle of Rnbert of Gloucester, ed. W. A. Wright, 2 vols. (RS, 1887), 11, 765,  
1. 11,734.  
55 DiptomaticDocuments, 1101-1272, ed. P. Chaplais (London, 1964), 
pp. 1-4. 56 ]. Beeler, Waifare in England, 1066-1189 (Cornell, 1966), pp. 
300-3.  
57 For the routiers see H. Geraud, 'Les routiers au XIIe siec1e', and 'Mercardier. Le 
routiers au XIIIe siec1e', Bibliotheque de l'tcole des Chartes, III (1841-2), 125-47,417-43;]. 
Boussard, 'Les mercenaires au XII siec1e. Henri II Plantagenet et les origines de 
l'armee de metier', Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Chartes, III (1945-6), 18g-224. On 
mercenaries in the eleventh and twelfth century in general see J. Schlight, Monarchs and 
Mercenaries (Bridgeport, 1968), and S. Brown, 'Military Service and Monetary Reward 
in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries', History, LXXIV (1989), 20-38.  
58 For these royal ingeniatores see R. A. Brown, 'Royal Castle-building in England, 1154-
1216', EHR., LXX (1955), 36g-74·  
59 'Benedict', 1,57; PR 6 Richard, pp. 175-6. Present at Nottingham was Master Urric, one 
of the king's ingeniatores, who seems to have regularly accompanied the royal siege 
train and specialised in the construction of engines.  
60 PR 6 Richard, p. 175. It is likely that Richard had' obtained this technology - which 
would be lacking to John's garrisons - from his experience on the Third Crusade, 
where the Turks had made extensive use of Greek fire, notably in the defence of Acre 
(Itinerarium perigorinorum et gesta Regis Ricardi, ed. w. Stubbs (RS, (864), pp. 81, 85,105, III, 
113,220-1). Intriguingly, the Pipe Rolls not only reveal the expenses paid for 
crossbowmen sent to Nottingham, but also those of 'quodam Saraceno et quodam 
Griffon'. Greek engineers, some of whom Richard may have encountered in Sicily or 
Cyprus, were regarded as highly skilled siege technicians: see e.g. William of Tyre, A 
Histury of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea, tr. E. A. Babcock and A. C. Krey, 2 vols. (Columbia, 
1941: repr., New York, 1976), 11,15-16.    
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Bedford in 122461 revealed that, given sufficient time and 
resources, the king could take the strongest of castles. Little 
wonder, then, that as the Barnwell annalist noted, the fall of 
Rochester undermined many men's faith in the efficacy of their 
fortifications.62  
In terms of defence against rebellion, not only were many royal 
cast1es superior in size and design to baronial strongholds,63 but 
the; rebels themselves frequently lacked siege engines. In May 
1215, in the brief campaign culminating in the granting of the 
Charter, both Wendover and the Barnwell annalist noted explicitly 
that the barons failed to take Northampton and Bedford because 
they lacked engines.64 That Prince Louis had no access to native 
expertise once he had landed in England is suggested by the fact 
that he had to ship his engines from France.65 It was the great 
trebuchet Malvoisin, requested for the siege of Dover, that weighed 
down Eustace the Monk's ship almost to the gunnels, and on 
whic};1 he himself was beheaded when the ship was captured by 
the English off Sandwich in 1217.66 
Yet, for all such purely military considerations, one returns to the 
overwhelming impression that the factor which most frequently 
terminated rebel resistance was the impact of the king's presence. 
Nowhere is this more strikingly demonstrated than in Richard's 
campaign of 1194 to subdue those garrisons in England holding out 
for Prince John. Merely the news of Coeur de Lion's return is said 
to have caused the rebel castellan of St Michael's  
.  
61 For a discussion of these two sieges see R. A. Brown, English Castles, 2nd edn (London, 
1976), pp. 190-4. References to the siege of Rochester are conveniently collected in S. 
Painter, King John (Baltimore, 1949), pp. 361-4, while for a detailed account of the 
logistics of the siege of Bedford see G. H. Fowler, 'Munitions in 1224', Bedfordshire 
Historical Record Society, v (1920), 117-32.  
62 Waiter of Coventry, Memorial,  ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols. (RS, 1872-3),II, 227: 'Pauci erant 
qui munitionibus se crederent'.  
63 Brown, English Cast1Rs, pp. 71--92: idem, 'Royal Castle-building', 354-
98.  
64 Waiter of Coventry, II, 219: CM, II, 586.  
 65 Chronicon Anglicanum, p. 172.  .  
66 L'Histoire de Guillaume 1R Marechal, ed. P. Meyer, 3 vols., Societe de I'Histoire de France 
(1891-1901), ll. 17387--96, 17450-5.  
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Mount, Henry de Pommeroy, to die of shock.67 Be that as it may, 
the great strongholds of Nottingham and Tickhill still held out 
resolutely. The latter had been besieged by the bishop of Durham, 
but on hearing reports of the return of the king himself, the 
garrison obtained licence from the bishop to send two knights to 
see for themselves. Immediately they found the news to be true 
they offered up the' castle to Richard.68 The garrison of 
Nottingham, however, continued to resist, not believing that the 
king had actually come, and hoping that instead this was simply a 
ruse by the royalist nobles to induce their surrender. Intensifi-
cation of the siege, however, led them to send out two messengers, 
who were granted an interview with the king. On confirmation of 
Richard's presence, the garrison capitulated almost immediately, 
putting life, limb and possessions in the king's mercy.69 Nothing 
could illustrate more clearly the intensely personal nature of 
authority and its enforcement; both the garrisons of Tickhill and 
Nottingham had to see Richard in the flesh before they would 
capitulate, but once they had done so surrender was almost instant.  
If such incidents highlight once more the importance of the 
king's presence, they again raise considerations of military 
reputation. The garrisons of Tickhill and Nottingham must have 
been fully aware of Richard's renown as a besieger, which had 
recently been augmented by the fall of Messina, several Cypriot 
fortresses and the great city of Acre. As the admiring Richard of 
Devizes noted, Richard 'knew nothing better than storming cities 
and overthrowing castles'. 70 Such a reputation had begun early in 
Richard's military career. While his elder brother Henry was 
establishing himself as the darling of the tournament circuit in 
northern France, the young count of Poitou was cutting his teeth 
in real warfare in the course of the endemic localised revolts in 
Aquitaine. He had demonstrated his military ability in the 
campaign of 1176 in which in addition to several castles he took 
both Limoges and Angouleme,71 but it was the storming in 1179 of  
67 Howden, III, 2388. 68 Ibid., 237-8.  
69 Ibid., 237-40 
70 Chronicon Richardi Divinensis de tempore regis Ricardi primi, ed. and tr. J. T. Appelby 
(London, 1963), p. 24  
71 'Benedict', I, 120-1.  
 
 
 
   
Talllebourg, the great fortress of Geoffrey de Rancon which was 
deemed to be impregnable, that really established Richard as a 
leading commander. Its storming after a sustained assault, which as 
Ralph of Diceto noted had been 'a most desperate enterprise, which 
none of his predecessors had ventured to attempt'72 greatly enhanced 
his prowess and earned him a triumphal reception by his father.  
More immediately, the shock and fear at the fall of such a strong 
castle caused the collapse of further resistance. Geoffrey's other main 
castle at Pons, which had successfully resisted Richard before the 
siege of Taillebourg, now surrendered immediately, since their lord 
had been captured. Within a month, the other leading rebel, Vulgrin 
of Angouleme, gave up his city and the castle of Montignac to 
Richard.73 Similar factors are visible at work in other campaigns 
where a combination of successful sieges and the personal arrival of 
the ruler resulted in a chain reaction causing a landslide of surrender. 
The wholesale capitulation of rebel garrisons in England following 
Henry II's arrival in 1174,74 Richard's re-establishment of control in 
the Angoumois in 1194,75 John's Poitou campaign of 1214,76 and 
almost total collapse of resistance during John's northern campaign 
of 1215-16 following the fall of Rochester77 are but some of the more 
prominent examples of this widely occurring phenomenon, As the 
author of the Gesta Stephani put it, describing how Baldwin de 
Redvers fled from Stephen despite having heavily fortified the Isle of 
Wight, God brought it about that 'he and his adherents should be 
smitten with despair of resistance to the king'. 78  
So far, we have examined those factors that made men reluctant to 
face the king in battle or siege. But important as these considerations 
were, we must not over-stress them. The high incidence of revolt in 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries clearly demonstrates that there 
were many who did not scruple to violate the bonds of homage and 
fealty, though conversely, the ease with which many rebellions were 
suppressed and the readiness of many  
72 Diceto, I, 431-2. 
73 'Benedict', I, 
74 Ibid., I, 72-3. 
75 Howden, Ill, 256-7. 
76 CM, 11, 572-3.  
77 Ibid., 636-42; for further references and a useful summary of this campaign see Painter, King 
John, pp. 368-71.  
78 CS, pp. 44-5.  
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rebels to capitulate swiftly indicates that here was a crucial 
disparity between the avowed aims of many of the insurrections 
and the desire to maintain effective opposition against the king.  
Yet a number of rebel lords, perhaps even a considerable 
number, were prepared to carry their enmity to its logical, even 
regicidal conclusion. This they might seek to achieve by a plot or 
ambush rather than openly face the king in arms. Thus, in 1095, 
Robert of M9wbray and his supporters had planned to ambush 
Rufus in woods bordering Mowbray's lands: This very attempt, 
however, caused an erstwhile plotter, Gilbert de Tonbridge, to 
throw himself on the king's mercy and reveal the whole con-
spiracy.79 Henry I was only saved from an assassin's arrow by the 
quality of his hauberk when he was fired upon en route to Wales,8o 
while it was' the opportunity provided by John's campaign against 
the Welsh in 1212 that led a group et barons headed by Eustace de 
Vesci and Robert fitzWalter to plan his assassination.81  
Others were more open in their attempts on the king's life.  
At the battle of Bremule in 1119, William Crispin succeeded in 
striking Henry I on the helmet before being overpowered,82 while 
Stephen was wounded during an ambush by Ranulf of Chester in 
1147.83 Examples of such personal assaults are rare largely because 
of the rarity with which rebel forces engaged the king in battle. In 
siege warfare, however, the king's life was frequently threatened by 
missile weapons. In 1183, whether by accident or design, the men of 
Limoges had twice fired upon Henry II and came close to killing 
him,84 while the rebel garrison at Nottingham in 1194 shot arrows 
close enough to Richard to kill a knight standing beside him.85 At 
Chaluz in 1199, Richard was not so fortunate, and died from the 
wound of a bolt.86  
It is interesting to note the prevalence of missile weapons in such 
attacks on the king. Bow, crossbow,javelins or stones were, of 
course, the principal means of defence for a besieged garrison. 
Unless as at Bourgtheroulde, 1124, and Lincoln, 1217, where 
bowmen were specifically ordered to aim not at the knights but at  
 79 Orderic, IV, 280-1.  80 GR, ll, 477-8.  
 81 Holt, Northerners, pp. 80-2.  82 Orderic, VI, 238-9.  
 83 GS, pp. 200-1.  84 'Benedict', I, 296.  
85 Howden, Ill, 238.  
86 See J. Gillingham, 'The Unromantic Death of Richard J.', speculum, LIV (1979), 18-41.  
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their horses,87 there could be no half measures with such lethal 
weapons; bolts or arrows took no prisoners. But may there also have 
been a sense in which the immediacy and enormity of physical 
assault on the king's person was somehow distanced by the use of 
such missile weapons? Although Malmesbury relates, with Henry of 
Huntingdon and Orderic, that at Lincoln in 1141. Stepheq. was 
physically overpowered and taken pr~soner,88 it is the Angevin 
apologist alQne who ascribes the king's ultimate fall to an inanimate 
object, thrown by an anonymous hand: Stephen was felled by a 
stone, 'and it is not known who dealt the blow' .89  
Degrees of readiness or reluctance to wound or kill the king can 
be explained both in personal terms and in the immediacy of 
lordship. When covering Henry II' s retreat from Le Mans in 1189, 
it was not by chance but by design that William Marshal slew 
Richard's horse and not the rider.90 William's intense loyalty to the 
House of Anjou, let alone his own sense of honour, would have 
made it inconceivable for him to have harmed the Angevin heir. It 
is equally clear that both Henry I's forces at Tinchebray and those 
of Robert of Gloucester at Lincoln in 1141 had no intention of 
killing either Robert Curthose or Stephen, despite the potentially 
awkward problem of how to dispose of a captured ruler. Similarly, 
at Lewes in 1264, it seems that the lives of Henry III, Richard of 
Cornwall and· the Lord Edward were never in serious danger. By 
the time of Evesham, however, the political situation had become 
such that de Montfort may well have sought the king's death by 
having the captured HenryJIl armed in a suit of de Montfort's own 
armour and placed in ·the line of battle, so that he might fall victim 
to royalist swords.91  
Where ties of lordship were weak or in dispute, the monarch's 
life was far more at risk. In 1099, despite having received a 
magnanimous grant of a day's respite from William Rufus, the 
Manceaux garrison of Mayet hurled a rock at"fhe besieging king 
and nearly killed him, while in 1183 the citizens of Limoges fired  
87 Orderic, VI, 350-1; CM, Ill, 21.  
88 Orderic, VI, 544; GS, pp. 112-13; HH, p. 274 
89 HN, p. 49.  
90 Guillaume le Marechal, ll. 8831-47.  
91 The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough, ed. H. Rothwell, Camden Soc., LXXXIX 
(1967), p. 201. For Lewes and Evesham in general see D. A. Carpenter, The Battles of 
Lewes and Evesham, 1264-65 (Keele, 1987).  
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on Henry II and came close to killing him.92 Where no ties of 
homage or fealty interposed, moreover, men might not hesitate to 
attempt the life of an opposing ruler. At Bouvines in 1214, Philip 
Augustus was saved from the attacks of the imperial infantry only, 
according to William le Breton, by the quality of his armour and his 
strong right arm,93 while in turn the French knights made a sustained 
effort to kill the Emperor Otto.94 Earlier that year, a lone' French 
crossbowman on the walls of Roche-aux-Moines had devised an 
ingenious plan to fire on John as he reconnoitred the walls, attaching 
yarn to a bolt which he fired at the king's shield bearer. Though he 
succeeded in pulling both bearer and pavise into the moat, John 
himself escaped.95 Long before his own demise at Chaluz in 1199, 
Richard had been wounded in the knee at the siege of Gaillon by a 
crossbow bolt fired by the routier captain Cadoe. That the wound 
was not more serious was probably only due to Cadoc's defective 
aim.96  
Underlying readiness to capitulate was the fear of royal 
vengeance and the desire to avoid the harsh penalties which failed 
rebellion might incur. For Anglo-Norman and Angevin kings 
regarded - and sought to punish - rebellion as proditio et infidelitas, a 
breach of the most sacrosanct bonds of homage and fealty. Thus 
Robert Curthose had the garrison ofSt-Ceneri mutilated in 1088.97 
At ~hrewsbury in 1138, Stephen hanged Arnulf de Hesdin and 
nirlety-three others, while Richard hanged the garrison of Chaluz 
in II99, and Henry the defenders of Bedford in 1224.98 In many 
instances, however, a combination of realpolitik, military prag-
matism and the extensive ties of kinship in existence between the 
Anglo-Norman nobility acted as potent constraints on the king's 
ability to punish rebels by death or mutilation. At Rochester in 
1088, and Exeter in 1136, for example, intense pressure from the 
nobles in their camp forced Rufus and Stephen respectively to 
spare the lives of the vanquished rebels, whom they had initially  
92 Orderic, v, 258-61; 'Benedict', I, 296.  
93 Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, ed. H. F. DeLaborde, 2 vols. (Paris, 1882, 1885), 
I,282.  
94 Ibid., 283-4; CM, II, 580-1.  
95 Chroniques des comtes d'Anjou et des seigneurs d'Amboise, ed. L. Halphen and P. Pourpardin  
(Paris, 1913), pp. 252-3.  
96 Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, ", 135 (PhilliPidos, v, 11. 258-67). 
97 Orderic, IV, 154-5.  
9B Orderic, VI, 520-3, and 522, n. 2; Howden, IV, 82-:3; CM, III, 86, 89.  
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been intent on executing as an example.99 When after the fall of 
Rochesterin 1215 John wished to hang William d'Aubigny and his 
fellow baronial rebels, he was prevented from so doing by the 
pragmatic arguments of the leading Poitevin noble, Savaric de 
Mauleon:  
My lord king, our war is not yet over, therefore you ought carefully to 
consider how the fortunes of war may turn; for if you now order us to 
hang these men, the barons, our enemies, will perhaps by a like event 
take me or other nobles of your army, and, following your example, hang 
us. Therefore do not let this happen, for in such a case no-one will fight 
in your cause. 100  
These combination of factors, moreover, not only limited the 
severity of royal retribution against insurgents, but frequently 
hampered the king's ability to successfully prosecute war against 
rebels in the field. That the close-knit bonds of kinship and 
political empathy between the Anglo-Norman nobility went far to 
limiting the extent of bloodshed in situations of civil war was 
apparent to contemporaries. 'This indeed was more than a civil 
war,' noted Orderic of Henry I's war in 1118 against William Clito, 
'and ties' of blood bound together brothers and friends and 
kinsmen who were fighting on both sides, so that neither wished to 
harm the other.'101 In certain instances, such as at Alton,1101, and 
Crowmarsh, 1153, the magnates succeeded in preventing dynastic 
rivals from joining pitched battle.102 Where such engagements did 
occur, they were singularly unbloody, as the absence of noble 
fatalities at Tinchebray, 1106, Bourgtheroulde, 1124, and Lincoln, 
1141, demonstrated.103  
In such circumstances, however, where the cross-channel 
aristocracy was repeatedly confronted with the painfully and 
potentially ruinous problems of divided allegiance, it was but a  
 99 Orderic, IV, 128-35; CS, pp. 38-43.  ,  
100 CM, n, 626. Exactly the same argument was used by Sir Waiter Manny to intercede 
with Edward III on behalf of the garrison of Calais in 1347: Froissart, Chronicles, ed. 
and tr. C .. Brereton (Harmondsworth, 1968), p. 106.  
101 Orderic, VI, 200-1.  
102 For the events at Alton, where the magnates prevented battle between Henry I and 
Robert Curthose, see C. Warren Hollister, 'The Anglo-Norman Civil War', in his 
Monarchy, Magnates and Institutions in the Anglo-Norman World (London, 1986), p, 90; 
for Crowmarsh, HH, pp. 287-8.  
103 Equally, at the second battle of Lincoln, 1217, Fawkes de Breaute ordered his cross-
bowmen to shoot the chargers of the Franco-baronial army, not their riders, and 
considerations of kinship allowed many to escape from the rout (CM, III, 21).  
 short step for erstwhile supporters of one dynastic claimant to secretly 
favour the cause of his opponent. Speaking again of Henry I's 
campaigns of 1118 against those Norman lords who had risen in favour 
ofWilliam Clito, Orderic commented:  
At that time King Henry could not support a long siege, because in the 
general confusion that always occurs in confltcts between kinsmen he 
was unable to trust his own men. Men who ate with him favoured the 
cause of his nephew, and, by prying into his secrets, greatly helped 
these men. 104 
His fears were still greater during the revolt of 1123, and during his 
siege of Pont Audemer, Henry 'held suspect a number of men who 
fawned on him like devoted followers, for he knew their secret plots 
and judged them to be traitors in reality' .105  
Because the investment of a castle was usually a lengthy process, 
siege offered far greater opportunities for collusion and covert aid to 
the defenders than campaigns of movement and open engagement. 
During Rufus's siege of Rochester in 1088, Roger de Montgommery 
and 'many Normans who were assisting at the siege, attempted to help 
the besieged secretly as far as they could, but they dared not raise arms 
openly against the king'.106 Though the castle was forced to capitulate, 
these nobles succeeded in pressuring Rufus against his will to spare the 
garrison. During his suppression of Robert of Mowbray's rebellion in 
1095, however, the king was in a far stronger position to resist such a 
fifth column within his army. At the siege of Bamburgh, 'those who 
were conscious of their treachery and their adherents kept silent for fear 
of discovery; pale with fear because they realised their attempt had 
failed, theYmingled with the royal forces and readily entered the 
service of the man whose ruin they had planned'.107 Penned up within 
the castle without the aid he had expected, Mowbray found this 
intolerable, loudly shouting to his conspirators by name and openly 
inciting them to respect the sworn conspiracy they had made. Hearing 
this, the king and his faithful vassals smiled to themselves, while the 
conspirators, knowing that their guilt was made'public, were tormented 
by fear and shame.108  
104 Orderic, VI, 200-1.  
105 Orderic, VI, 340-1. Orderic's comment is corroborated by SD, II, 274. 
106 Orderic, IV, 126-g.  
 107 Orderic, IV, 282-3. 108 Ibid.  
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Since many 'rebellions' between 1088 and 1154 were in fact 
risings on behalf of dynastic rivals such as Robert Curthose, 
William Clito or the Angevins who had as strong if not a superior 
claim to legitimacy than the ruling king, these factors of baronial 
kinship and political empathy undoubtedly compromised the 
psychological advantages otherwise enjoyed by the ruler in 
warfare against erstwhile vassals, thereby further hindering his 
effective prosecution of war.  
Such considerations were given an added dimension and 
potency should the insurrection be headed by a royal cadet who 
was heir to the throne. In circumstances such as Robert Curthose's 
rebellions against his father, and still more prominently in the 
revolts of Angevin cadets between 1173 and 1194, the supporters of 
the present king were acutely conscious that in supporting the 
father against his rebellious sons they were in all probability 
waging war against their future sovereign.  
By mid-1189, for example, the speed and totality with which 
resistance crumbled in the face of the assaults of Richard, the de 
facto if not unequivocally de jure heir to Henry II's empire, and his 
Capetian ally reveal the extent to which the majority of Henry II's 
erstwhile supporters had bowed to the inevitable and deserted the 
sick, and ageing king. The Histoire de Guillaume le Marechal 
graphically conveys the fear and uncertainty experienced by those 
who, in opposition to the count of Poitou, had remained with the 
Old King to the last, not least William the Marshal, who had most 
cause for concern since he had personally unhorsed Richard 
outside Le Mans.109 As it was, Richard instantly pardoned those 
who had stood by his father, valuing their loyalty and rather 
contemning those who had deserted Henry in extremis.110  
But men could not always be certain of such magnanimous 
treatment. Thus in March 1193, on being informed of Richard's 
imminent release by the German emperor, the regency council 
decided to lay siege to John's main castles. Despite the fact that 
Windsor was on the verge of surrender, however, news that  
109 GuiUaume le MaTticha~ ll. 8773~34I.  
110 'Benedict', II, 72. When three prominent lords, Guy de Valle, Ralph de Fougeres and 
Geoffrey de Mayenne, who had deserted Henry just before the fall of Le Mans, came 
to Richard seeking a reward and a reinstatement of the lands and castles taken from 
them by the Old King, Richard disseised them, saying they were traitors who had 
deserted their lord in his hour of need.  
  
 
Richard was being detained once again led WaIter of Coutances 
and his colleagues to make a truce with Count John, which left 
Nottingham and Tickhill still in his hands.111 They could not 
afford to alienate John completely while there was still a substan-
tial risk that Richard might not return.1l2 That the king was not in 
fact released till February 1194 showed the wisdom of their 
caution. Immediately on receiving confirmation of the king's 
liberation, however, the regents disseised John and again laid 
siege to his castles.ll3 Despite the complete legitimacy of quelling 
rebellion against their lord the king, the successful prosecution of 
war against the heir apparent was only expedient if it seemed to 
the king's supporters that their present master would sit securely 
on the throne for the years to come.  
Let us conclude with the most striking example of all, which 
demonstrates both the consternation men might feel at having 
fought against the heir apparent, and also the disquiet at taking up 
arms against an anointed ruler. For when the young Henry 
Plantagenet, crowned and anointed in 1170, rose against his father 
in 1173-4 and again in 1183, Henry II’s familiares were placed in an 
unenviable situation. Their successful resistance to the Young 
King was completely within the bounds of vassalic propriety for, 
~en, they had performed homage and fealty to him, it had been 
expressly saving that owed to the Old King, his father. Yet it was 
undeniable that young Henry was a king, whose special status, 
once created, could not be ignored even in the circumstances of 
revo1t.1l4 Despite the essential illegality of the Young King's 
rebellion, moreover, Henry's supporters had cause to fear the 
recriminations of the man they had defeated in war if later he 
succeeded to the throne. These fears are clearly voiced in Jordan 
Fantosme's poem on the 'great war', which not only urges 
reconciliation between father and son, but seeks to demonstrate to 
the Young King the courage and fidelity of Henry II ' s jamiliares,  
111 Howden, III, 206-7.  
112 Despite incurring the charge of being traitors to the king and his realm, Hugh Bardulf 
and William de Stuteville had already refused to allow Geoffrey, archbishop of York, 
to lay siege to Tickhill, 'because they were liege men of CountJohn', Howden, III, 
206.  
113 Howden, III, 236-7.  
114 In the aftermath of the war of 1173-4, Henry accepted the homage of Richard and 
Geoffrey, but at first refused that of the younger Henry 'quia rex erat' ('Benedict', I, 79, 
82-3)·  
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stressing that they are his natural counsellors, who will in turn 
stand by him should he merit their fidelity.115
Most eloquent of all, however, is the peace treaty of 1174 
between father and son. Despite Henry II's overwhelming victory 
over the coalition that had been leagued against him, the treaty not 
only pardons those who had taken up arms against the Old King, 
but contains a reciprocal provision securing the Young King's 
pardon and future good will to all those who had aided his father 
against him.ll6 In the light of these considerations, Henry II's 
unequivocal and ultimately disastrous prevarication and 
obfuscation over nominating Richard as his principal heir after the 
death of the Young King in 1183 become more understandable. 
Though in the end his failure to allow the baronage to perform 
homage to Richard engendered the rebellion that caused his 
downfall and death, Henry was adamant that any future 
insurrection should not be headed by a man who, like himself, was 
also the anointed of the Lord.  
115 M.]. Strickland, 'Arms and the Men: War, Loyalty and Lordship in Jordan Fantosme's 
Chronicle', in The Ideas and Practice of Medieval Knighthood, IV, ed. C. Harper-Bill and 
R. Harvey (Woodbridge, 1992), pp. 187-200.  
116 'Benedict', I, 77-3.  
 
